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Abstract. Decentralized systems can be more resistant to operator mis-
chief than centralized ones, but they are substantially harder to develop,
deploy, and maintain. This cost is dramatically reduced if the decentral-
ized part of the system can be made highly generic, and thus incorporated
into many different applications. We show how existing anonymization
systems can serve this purpose, securing a public database against equiv-
ocation by its operator without the need for cooperation by the database
owner. We derive bounds on the probability of successful equivocation,
and in doing so, we demonstrate that anonymization systems are not only
important for user privacy, but that by providing privacy to machines
they have a wider value within the internet infrastructure.
1 Introduction
Suppose you want to call someone, but do not know their phone number. How
do you find it? The obvious way is to look them up in a phone book, but the
phone company might have placed a different address under their name. If they
are particularly security conscious, then you might presume that, when they
received their phone book, they checked to see whether their number is correctly
listed. But what if it were not modified in every phone book, but some contain
the real number and some contain a false one?
The authentication of database entries and user attributes is an important
problem in information security; one of the most prominent applications is in key-
distribution for end-to-end secure messaging. Some systems use centralized key-
distribution services, placing trust in the operators of their servers. Others use
decentralized methods, but existing methods come with their own limitations;
the public-key infrastructure allows most certificate authorities to impersonate
anyone, and mainstream blockchain systems waste power calculating proofs of
work. The result is that even when a database can be realistically distributed,
the designers of many systems choose not to do so.
This task is greatly simplified if we can decentralize a system in a generic
way, adding standard components that can be reused for many systems. We
show in Sections 2 and 3 that an anonymization system serves this purpose, in
many cases without modification or even the cooperation of the central server.
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Our contribution in this paper is to show that a variation of the multi-path
probing [1] approach used by DetecTor [2] is provably secure. Users simulta-
neously make identical requests to a central service via an anonymizer. If they
receive consistent responses, then they can assure themselves that the server
provides identical responses to identical requests; we show in Section 3.4 that a
server can successfully equivocate across N users for M rounds with probability
at most N1−M .
This approach has a number of advantages over other anti-equivocation tech-
niques in the literature:
– No bootstrapping problem. By using an existing anonymity system to
audit quite general services, new systems can obtain the benefits of dis-
tributed auditing without an existing community to provide operator-diverse
monitoring systems.
– Scalability. Users do not need to communicate with each other, except
to signal that the service has misbehaved. As a result, the communication
overhead is only O(log ) for a given security level .
– Computational efficiency. Because we do not use a proof-of-work system,
no computational power is wasted on what is generally pointless busywork
whose only purpose is to make participation costly.
This is relevant to our first point: a new proof-of-work system is not secure
until it has enough miners to out-compute any potential attacker. This cre-
ates a chicken-and-egg problem, in that the system is not secure until it is
widely adopted, which will not happen if it is insecure.
– No server-side cooperation needed. This approach does not require
any changes on the server-side; as a result, it is quite practical for motivated
users to audit existing services without the need for effort or cooperation
from their operators.
The first of these points is particularly important, as many pieces of software
begin as a small-scale project by individuals or groups without third-party com-
mitment. Our protocol provides a distributed auditing capability that has until
now been completely unavailable to such projects.
1.1 Motivation
Our principal motivation for the development of this auditing method is to
allow the use of centralized key-distribution servers in a secure manner. Key
distribution is a difficult problem to solve, and as it stands there are few solutions
that do not centralize trusted operations to a significant degree, requiring manual
verification on the part of users in order to eliminate the risks posed by malicious
infrastructure operators.
The need for manual effort is problematic in multiple ways; the first is that
most users will simply not bother, but even amongst those users who do make
the effort, they will not necessarily wait for the verification to take place be-
fore communicating. This leaves a window of vulnerability before an attack is
detected, which in the case of manual in-person verification may be very long
indeed.
Our desire, then, is to allow users to take responsibility for the security of
their own identity to the greatest extent possible, but in a way that does not
require a significant degree of manual effort.
1.2 Public-key distribution: the status quo
The most widely-accepted systems that are configured by end-users, such as
Secure Shell (SSH) [3] and WhatsApp [4], tend to use a trust-on-first-use [1]
model, in which initial communication takes place with either no or only manual
authentication, after which the the user is alerted to key changes. However, this
does not prove the identity of the user unless the two parties use some out-of-
band authentication method.
This can be overcome by standards such as X.509 [5], which use signed certifi-
cates to verify identities: X.509 is widely adopted by email clients, but the need
to acquire certificates from a commercial certificate authority has prevented it
from seeing any significant use; in addition, most certificate authorities can issue
certificates for anyone in the world, an ability that has been abused on a number
of occasions both by attackers and the operators of the authorities. Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) [6] aims to provide message-level security to the masses, but has
been hampered by the difficulty of its key management, which depends upon
personal contact to establish trust relationships.
Identity-based cryptography provides another approach, in which trust in a
key needs only be established at the organizational level rather than between
individual users, but this allows access to private keys by service providers; the
ubiquity of adversaries with coercive powers and an interest in mass surveillance
means that this is entirely inadequate from a privacy standpoint. While the risk
might be mitigated with the aid of threshold cryptosystems or other distributed
approaches, if the desire to decrypt a user’s communications exists at an or-
ganizational level then threshold decryption and secret sharing provides little
protection to users.
1.3 Related work
The problem of obtaining agreement on a value amongst several—possibly malicious—
users is an old one, known as the Byzantine Generals problem, and was first an-
alyzed by Lamport et al. in 1982 [7]. Several officers plan for an attack, in which
they must act simultaneously in order to be successful. This is complicated by
the knowledge that some of the officers may be traitors—including the general in
command of all of them—and may therefore send different messages to different
units in an effort to induce a doomed attack.
Consensus protocols have seen increasing prominence in recent years with
the rise of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [8], whose security against double-
spending depends upon public scrutiny of the submitted transactions. If con-
sensus on the transaction ledger is broken—that is to say, if different users see
different values—different transaction records can be sent to different users, al-
lowing double-spending to occur.
Traditional consensus protocols Traditional consensus-based approaches [9]
are effective, but typically do not scale well to large numbers of participants [10].
Significantly, they require communication channels between many of the nodes
taking part in the consensus protocol, with resistance to traitors being limited
by the connectivity of the network graph. This is inconvenient in practice, as it
requires individual clients to discover and communicate with large numbers of
independent nodes, and requiring a large community in the first place in order to
bootstrap the network, since additional nodes controlled by the same operator
make the system less secure as it increases the number of traitorous nodes if the
the operator is malicious.
Proof-of-work protocols The Bitcoin protocol [8] prevents the consensus from
being split by requiring a proof-of-work in order for the transaction to be pub-
lished, hash-linked to the previous state of the ledger. This functions somewhat
analogously to a voting system, with the state of the ledger being collectively
determined by whichever group has the most computational power.
This type of protocol has the advantage over classical protocols [11] of not
requiring large amounts of communication amongst the users in question. For
example, the algorithm presented in [11] requires a message count that is O(N2)
in the number of users.
A disadvantage of the proof-of-work approach is the need for popularity—the
security of proof-of-work-based systems comes from the expense of performing
enough computation to compete with the rest of the network, meaning that
smaller projects will initially be completely controlled by their founders, and
even after the appearance of independent miners, they will be vulnerable for
some time to the sudden appearance of an adversary with large amounts of
computing power. Furthermore, the computation of these proofs-of-work requires
large amounts of power, making the scheme rather inefficient.
Collective signing An alternative method has recently been proposed that uses
collective signing [12,13]. This allows consensus to be efficiently demonstrated
by collectively-generated digital signatures. If the consensus group is known in
advance, then this allows us to ensure that the entire group has accepted the
same piece of data.
Knowledge of the group members is a potential problem; in [13], where the
collective signing approach was applied to Bitcoin, group membership is given
to those who have recently mined a block, taking advantage of the proof-of-work
system to prevent Sybil attacks.
Without a proof-of-work system, some other transparent way of determining
who will be invited to take part in the collective signature process is necessary.
Nonetheless, such an approach will prove effective, if the necessary infrastructure
comes into being.
The primary disadvantage of this approach is the need for dedicated verifi-
cation infrastructure; this creates a bootstrapping problem when new types of
verification are needed. Nonetheless, this may be overcome for verification tasks
such as domain verification that have wide commercial appeal.
Multi-path probing Our proposed technique is a special case of multi-path
probing. Multi-path probing involves accessing a service from several points of
view in order to detect local variations in responses such as caused a man-in-
the-middle attack located far from the service in question.
The first such system was Perspectives [1]. This system uses a number of
notary servers, which scan publicly-accessible web services for keys. By doing so
regularly, they obtain a record of a service’s public-key history, and thus allowing
users to convince themselves that the server has not changed its public key
recently. By accessing multiple such notaries, they can see the key as it appears
from several network perspectives. This reduces the risk posed by a malicious
notary. Unfortunately, much of this functionality depends upon knowledge of
the protocol in use, so that the public key can be extracted. This means that
new services cannot be audited with Perspectives until they have developed a
following sufficient to justify their support by a large number of notary servers.
A simpler approach, and the direct inspiration for our scheme, is implemented
by DoubleCheck [14]. When connecting to a server, DoubleCheck makes a sec-
ond connection via Tor, which it uses to acquire a copy of its certificate. This
certificate is compared with that obtained via the direct connection, and the
user is warned if they do not match. The same approach is used by DetecTor [2],
which is notable for suggesting that operators use it to verify the state of their
own servers.
The CONIKS [15] directory system, includes a Perspectives-like scheme in
its architecture, going so far as to include bounds on the probability of successful
equivocation by a given number of malicious auditors. Their analysis is related
to a special case of our own, but crucially assumes the existence of independent
auditors who store and distribute their signed tree roots. This allows clients to
see the database from multiple viewpoints, but creates a bootstrapping problem.
Our contribution is to demonstrate that it is possible to design an anti-
equivocation system like that proposed for CONIKS without dedicated auditing
systems. We describe a DetecTor-like system whose consensus is provably secure,
relative to the sender anonymity of the anonymization system in use.
2 Verification protocol
Suppose that Bob wishes to acquire a piece of information from an untrusted
anonymously-accessed service, and Alice the auditor can detect whether a given
response from the server is valid. The protocol that we propose is as follows:
1. At a predetermined time, Alice and Bob both request a copy of the message
from the service.
2. The service responds to their requests with the message provided.
3. Steps one and two are repeated M times.
4. If Bob does not receive M identical responses, he publicly signals an error.
5. Alice checks that the messages that she has received are identical and valid,
and publicly signals an error if not.
We show this in Figure 1. Clients who see evidence of equivocation know that
the service is untrustworthy, and can report its misbehavior. If the responses are
signed, these clients can prove to third parties that the server has equivocated,
providing a substantial deterrent to misbehavior on the part of the service.
CENTRAL
SERVICE
CLIENTS
ANONYMIZER
Response 1
2
3
4
5
Accepts Accepts ErrorErrorError
Fig. 1. Interpretation of the results obtained from the protocol. Clients that have
not received consistent responses from the server reject the response from the server,
which they know to be faulty. Clients that have consistently received the same response
accept it as unequivocated. In this figure, the server has equivocated, with the third
and fourth clients being unaware of the fact and the others detecting the misbehavior
of the service.
Any anonymizing system can be used for this protocol, but in general syn-
chronized system such as a mix-net will be more effective, as these provide little-
to-no room for timing attacks. In practice, low-latency anonymization networks
such as Tor are far more available than mix-nets; we discuss the methods used
to close the timing side-channel attacks in Appendix A.
3 Security Analysis
There are many anonymizing systems in use, the most popular by far being
Tor [16]. One of the goals of Tor is to prevent users from being deanonymized
over the long term [16]. This is a reasonable target, given that one of Tor’s
stated purposes is the protection of dissidents and journalistic sources from state-
level adversaries. Compromizing a single request over the course of many years
might well result in catastrophic consequences for the user; even if that single
request does not contain any compromising information, it may tie them to a
pseudonym—e.g. a social media account whose activities are known. As an exam-
ple of this, the head of the hacking group LulzSec was arrested after connecting
to an online chat server on just a single occasion without using Tor [17].
Our requirements are different—whereas a dissident, leaker, or criminal de-
sires to minimize the probability that they will ever be deanonymized, our desire
is to minimize the probability that an individual request is deanonymized, since
the security of the design that we will describe shortly is determined by the num-
ber of requests that can be made without being connected to one another. We
will discuss this distinction in greater detail in Section 3.2, but it is important
to highlight that what we describe is only one of many possible definitions of
anonymity that has been chosen to meet our needs.
3.1 Definitions
We begin by defining some notation. We consider a set of users U = {U1, . . . , UN}
who take part in the protocol above. This is our anonymity set.
We write the set of injections from A into B as Inj(A → B), and bijections
from A to B as Bij(A→ B).
These users connect to a service via an anonymizer, all making identical
requests. We model this process in Figure 2. The anonymizer makes a request
to the adversary on behalf of the clients, providing partial information on which
response will go to which user.
3.2 Adversary model
We define our security relative to the security of an anonymity system, and
in particular to the notion of sender anonymity as defined by Pfitzmann and
Ko¨ntopp [18], and loosely follow the formalisation given by Backes et al. [19], but
extended to N simultaneous users and M request-response rounds. We select this
definition because it provides the most direct route to our statistical quantities
of interest; this type of definition can be related to indistinguishability-based
definitions such as those by Backes et al. in a straightforward manner [19].
Definition 1 (Sender-anonymous service).
Suppose a set of users U = {U1, . . . , UN} each make a series of M identical
and synchronous requests to a service via an anonymizer, receiving a response,
as in Figure 2.
Then, consider the experiment in Figure 3 for any adversary A, with the leak-
age function L being a system parameter. We call the combination of anonymiza-
tion system and service -sender-anonymous,  ≥ 0, if for all adversaries A,
Pr[EXP-SAL,U,M (A) = 1] ≤ 1
N !
(1 + ) . (1)
AnonRequest(U ,A,L)
/ Select request identifiers by random assignment.
RI(·) $←− Bij(U → Z|U|)
/ The adversary provides a response for
/ each request number
RV(·) $←− A(L(RI)) / RV : Z|U| → {0, 1}∗
/ Return the response identifiers and values.
return RI(·), RV(·)
Fig. 2. A model of an anonymously-accessed service, where A is the potentially-
malicious service, and L is a leakage function that captures the information leaked
to the adversary. In the case of Tor, for example, L is the user-to-request mapping RI
with its domain restricted to users whose entry guards are surveilled by the attacker.
The service accepts a set of users, and selects a random mapping from users to request
identifiers. The adversary is given system-dependent partial information on the source
of each request, and invited to provide a response to each request.
This definition assumes that all users operate in lockstep, masking their iden-
tities by making identical requests with covert channels sufficiently masked that
the probability of successfully linking consecutive requests is no better than
chance. We use a multiplicative parameter 1 +  rather than an additive one be-
cause this simplifies the analysis to follow; the same results hold with an additive
parameter + = N !.
The most straightforward way to achieve this is the mix-net [20], where a
chain of hosts, called mixes, re-encrypt and shuffle fixed-sized messages, guar-
anteeing anonymity so long as at least one member of the chain is honest. The
anonymity set here is the set {Ui} of users who take part in the protocol.
From our perspective, this means that the adversary is unable respond so in
such a way as to target a particular user with a particular response. Whether
the adversary has compromised the service or is performing a man-in-the-middle
attack is immaterial; all we require is that they cannot deanonymize the requests
in time to send messages tailored to a particular user.
In some systems this is proven with respect to particular computational hard-
ness assumptions [21], whereas other systems such as Tor are ad-hoc [22] and
will fall to a global passive adversary. Our approach is implicitly conditional
upon whichever assumptions are made by the underlying anonymization sys-
tem; should a provably-secure alternative to Tor become equally widespread, it
will serve just as well.
EXP-SAL,U,M (A).
/ Prime the adversary with M − 1 anonymous requests.
for i = 1 . . . (M − 1)
State
$←− State ‖ AnonRequest(U ,AState,L)
endfor
/ Perform the final request.
RI(·), RV(·) $←− AnonRequest(U ,AState,L)
/ Let the adversary identify a response identifier for each user.
Rˆ(·) $←− A(U ,L, State)
/ The adversary wins if they sent their responses to the
/ users that they thought.
if Rˆ(·) = RI(·)
return 1
else
return 0
endif
Fig. 3. Security experiment for sender-anonymity. An anonymity system, defined by
its leakage function L, is used to make requests to an adversary who aims provide
particular messages to particular users. The adversary is asked to determine the users
to whom each of its responses were sent; it wins if it correctly identifies all of the
recipients.
There exists the possibility that an attacker might use a denial-of-service to
prevent an individual user from accessing the server, if the attacker is able to
identify the link that they use to connect to the anonymizing service. Defeating
this type of attack is outside the scope of this paper, however we note that it
will always be recognized as a fault by the user in question and reported as such.
While this definition makes clear the capabilities of the adversary, it is not
ideal for calculation. We will thus make extensive use of the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Consider the protocol from Section 2 with N users, where the
anonymizing service is a synchronous -sender-anonymous service, as in Def-
inition 1. Then, for any adversary A with arbitrary knowledge of the recipients
of the previous messages, the recipients of responses 1, . . . , N are approximately
uniformly distributed over Bij(ZN → U), with each of the N ! mappings from
responses to recipients occuring with probability at most (N !)−1(1 + ).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary round of requests in the described protocol. We
note that the security experiment in Figure 3 mirrors steps one to three of the
protocol, with the function RI(·) representing the response destinations for the
round under consideration. Thus, by our assumption of -sender-anonymity, the
adversary can predict all of the response destinations with probability at most
(N !)−1(1 + ).
We now proceed by contradiction. Suppose the adversary can act in such a
way that some response-user mapping R : ZN → U occurs with probability greater
than (N !)−1(1 + ). Then, in Figure 3, the adversary can select this mapping as
their prediction Rˆ : ZN → U of the message destinations. By supposition, this
is is correct with a probability greater than (N !)−1(1 + ), in contradiction of
Definition 1, yielding the desired contradiction.
We note that when  = 0, this implies that the recipients of each message
are perfectly uniformly distributed.
It is this mixing property that we use to provide security. Any response sent
by the service will be received with equal probability by all of its users, and
thus it is impossible to reliably provide auditors with a different set of records
without defeating the anonymizer.
We also posit the existence of some global channel that allows a user to warn
others that a fault has occurred, and that the adversary cannot block. We argue
that this is a legitimate assumption, since failures can be provided to third-
party reporting services or, if all else fails, manually sent via email to a public
mailing list. If the server signs and time-stamps its responses, its misbehavior
is non-repudiable, thus preventing false-positives from being used to flood the
channel.
3.3 Probability of discord between pairs of users
In our analysis, we consider two separate scenarios. First, that where one user
wishes to verify the details of another without trusting that others clients will
inform them of inconsistencies in the responses. This is the case with many
legacy systems, for example data from PGP keyservers or arbitrary websites,
as it is reasonable to assume that one might be the only person attempting to
verify the details of any particular user at any given moment.
In the second scenario, the service acts like a traditional broadcaster—many
users attempt to access the same data, for example a Merkle tree root for Cer-
tificate Transparency, CONIKS, or Bitcoin. In this case we may assume that a
certain number of users are active in the protocol and able to publicly report
failures—for widely-distributed software, it is implausible that there would not
be at least a few hundred or thousand active users at any given time—allowing
misbehaviour to be detected with a yet-higher probability.
We start by considering the first case, where a given user is isolated from the
other users as in Figure 1. Suppose N users each make M identical requests to
the sender-anonymous service. It responds with K copies of one message x, and
N −K copies of another message x′. These destinations of these messages will
be uniformly distributed over the set of users, as shown in Theorem 1.
We begin by justifying our use of only two messages, x and x′.
Lemma 1. When the described protocol is run with more than two users, the
maximum probability of successful equivocation occurs when only two values are
transmitted.
Proof. Suppose the service can transmit values {x, x′, x′′, . . .}. Then, for any
choice of responses, if x′′, x′′′, . . . are replaced by x′, every sequence of responses
that do not trigger a failure by any set of users will still be accepted by those
users. Thus the maximum probability of successful equivocation is achieved by a
service transmitting only the true value x and a single false value x′.
This lemma is useful when bounding the probability of acceptance, as it
permits us to consider only two possible responses. The goal of the attacker,
then, is that some users receive one response value every time, and and others
receive the other response value each time. Should Definition 1 hold, this is
exceedingly unlikely, as we show in Lemma 3.
The analysis is eased substantially if we consider a perfect anonymization
system—that is, with  = 0—for which the process of responding to the anony-
mous requests with one of two responses is readily modelled by the process of
pulling coloured balls from an urn. In this analogy, the response x is represented
by a white ball, and x′ by a black one; the balls are drawn from the urn without
replacement, yielding the probability of a particular set of responses over the
entire set of users.
We begin by showing how a probability bound calculated with respect to a
0-sender-anonymous service can be loosened in order to apply to an -sender-
anonymous service.
Lemma 2 (Imperfect anonymizer correction.). Let E be some event taken
over the sample space of N !M message→recipient mappings for an -sender-
anonymous service with N users over M rounds, and Pr [E ] be the probability
that E occurs given some such service.
Then,
Pr [E ] ≤ Pr0 [E ] (1 + )M , (2)
where Pr0 [E ] is the probability that E occurs given a uniform distribution of
mappings.
Proof. Let us first consider an individual outcome
r ∈ Ω = Bij(ZN → U)M (3)
= r1 × r2 × · · · × rM , (4)
where the ri ∈ Bij(ZN → U) are the response destinations for round i. The event
{r} in which the outcome r occurs may then be written
{r} = R1 ∩ · · · ∩RM (5)
where
Ri = Bij(ZN → U)i−1
× ri
× Bij(ZN → U)M−i−1. (6)
With a uniform probability measure Pr0 [· ], r occurs with probability N !−M .
With our adversary-degraded probability measure Pr [· ], r will occur with
probability
Pr [{r} ] = Pr [R1 ∩ · · · ∩RM ] (7)
=
M∏
i=1
Pr [Ri |R1 ∩ · · · ∩Ri−1 ] , (8)
which Theorem 1 bounds by
≤
M∏
i=1
1
N !
(1 + ) (9)
= (1 + )M Pr0 [{r} ] . (10)
As the probability space is finite, we may write any event E as a disjoint finite
union
E =
⋃
e∈E
{e}, (11)
and thus
Pr [E ] = Pr
[ ⋃
e∈E
{e}
]
(12)
=
∑
e∈E
Pr [{e}] (13)
≤ (1 + )M
∑
e∈E
Pr0 [{e}] (14)
= (1 + )M Pr0 [E ] , (15)
the statement that we set out to prove.
With this lemma in hand, we may bound the probability of any failure event
as though the anonymity of the users is perfect, applying a multiplicative fac-
tor (1 + )M after the fact in order to account for the imperfect nature of the
anonymization system. This is convenient for our calculations, because the prob-
abilities of our events of interest can then be easily determined by straightforward
coloured-balls-in-an-urn calculations.
Lemma 3. Suppose N users take part in the described protocol exactly once,
including a particular pair of users Alice and Bob. The service provides K copies
of the message x, and N −K copies of a message x′. Then, Bob will receive the
value x′ and Alice the value x with probability
pi ≤ K(N −K)
N(N − 1) (1 + ). (16)
Proof. Where the service satisfies -sender-anonymity with  = 0, the recipients
of the responses are uniformly distributed and thus this problem is equivalent to
that as that of pulling balls from an urn: given an urn containing K white balls
and N − K black balls, acceptance is equivalent to drawing first a white ball—
probability K/N—and then a black ball—probability (N−K)/(N−1)—resulting
in a joint probability of
p(b,w) =
K
N
N −K
N − 1 . (17)
Application of Lemma 2 yields the original expression for arbitrary security pa-
rameters 0 ≤ .
Theorem 2 (Probability of specific failure modes).
Suppose N users take part in the described protocol with a sender-anonymous
service, including Alice and Bob. Then, after M iterations Alice will accept the
value x and Bob the value x′ with probability at most
pdecep ≤
[
N
2
]M (
N − [N2 ])M
NM (N − 1)M (1 + )
M . (18)
Proof. We first consider the case where  = 0. In order for Bob to accept a
false value without detection by Alice, the service must succeed all M times in
sending x to Alice and some other value x′ to Bob. Lemma 1 indicates that the
maximum probability of success occurs when only a single false value is emitted,
so we assume that all responses are either x or x′.
Suppose that in round i, the service responds Ki times with x and N − Ki
times with x′.
The probability that Alice receives x and Bob x′ is given by Lemma 3 as
pi ≤ Ki(N −Ki)
N(N − 1) , (19)
and the probability of Bob accepting the false value without Alice noticing is
therefore
p ≤
∏M
i=1Ki(N −Ki)
NM (N − 1)M . (20)
This is maximized by setting Ki = [N/2]; when N is odd, Ki can be rounded in
either direction by the attacker—rounding up is more likely to result in the true
value being accepted, whereas rounding down increases the likelihood of rejection.
The maximum probability of a successful attack is therefore
pdecep ≤
[
N
2
]M (
N − [N2 ])M
NM (N − 1)M . (21)
Application of Lemma 2 yields the original expression for arbitrary security pa-
rameters 0 ≤ .
As Alice and Bob are unaware of the number of other users accessing the
service, they must assume the worst-case value; this occurs when, N = 2 yielding
pdecep ≤ 2−M . As the number of users increases, the bound will approach 4−M ;
we note again that this is the probability of false acceptance for a single pair
of users, and so does not take into account the possibility that other users will
detect the substitution and report it publicly.
Theorem 2 provides an important quantity that is directly applicable to the
security of a directory service: the maximum probability that the service can
deceive a user looking up a piece of information without being noticed by a single
auditor. We can view this from another point of view, namely the probability of
breaking the consensus between pairs of nodes. The essential difference is that
Theorem 2 does not consider a broken consensus to be a failure if Alice accepts
the value x, even if Bob receives a copy of x′ and so reports misbehavior, despite
the service having successfully broken the consensus.
Theorem 3 (Probability of pairwise discord). Suppose N users take part
in the described protocol, including Alice and Bob. Then, after M rounds Alice
and Bob will accept distinct values with probability at most
psplit ≤ 2
[
N
2
]M (
N − [N2 ])M
NM (N − 1)M (1 + )
M . (22)
Proof. We first consider the case where  = 0, proceeding as follows: first, we
calculate the probability that Alice and Bob will receive different values in the
initial round, then we apply Theorem 2 to calculate the maximum probability
that they will both receive these initial values for the remainder of the protocol.
Suppose that in the first round of the protocol, the server responds with K1
copies of the value z and N − K1 copies of the value z′. Then, the probability
that Alice and Bob will receive different values is the probability of receiving z
and z′ respectively, or z′ and z. As these events are disjoint, this probability is
equal to
p1 = 2
K1(N −K1)
N(N − 1) (23)
by Lemma 3.
Let us denote the value received by Alice x and that received by Bob x′. Then,
by Theorem 2, the probability of that the remaining M − 1 rounds will result in
Alice receiving only the value x and Bob x′ is at most[
N
2
]M−1 (
N − [N2 ])M−1
NM−1(N − 1)M−1 , (24)
yielding an overall consensus-breaking probability of
psplit[K1] ≤ 2 K1(N −K1)
N(N − 1)
×
[
N
2
]M−1 (
N − [N2 ])M−1
NM−1(N − 1)M−1 . (25)
This is maximized by setting K1 = [N/2] and thus
psplit ≤ 2
[
N
2
]M (
N − [N2 ])M
NM (N − 1)M . (26)
Application of Lemma 2 yields the original expression for arbitrary security pa-
rameters 0 ≤ .
The probability of undetectably breaking the consensus between any pair of
nodes thus falls exponentially with time, never being greater than 21−M .
3.4 Probability of undetected consensus-breaking
We now take a more global view, and calculate the probability that the service
can equivocate without being detected by any of its users. Where trustworthy
reporting infrastructure exists to allow the publication of equivocation reports
to all of the users of the service, this is the applicable probability of failure. Fur-
thermore, from the point of view of the attacker or malicious service operator,
this is the probability that their attack will be detected, and thus the most im-
portant consideration from a deterrance point of view. The service may attempt
to mislead as before, but the difficulty of achieving global acceptance increased
by the need to provide consistent responses to all users.
Theorem 4 (Detection of consensus splits). Suppose N users take part in
the described protocol, and the attacker provides the response x′ to K users and
x 6= x′ to N −K users. If this is repeated over M rounds, the probability that the
attacker will succeed in providing MN consistent responses to all N users over
all M rounds is
pc ≤
(
N
K
)1−M
(1 + )M . (27)
Proof. We first consider the case where  = 0. By Theorem 1, responses to
an anonymous service are randomly assigned to users. There exist
(
N
K
)
ways to
assign the K false responses amongst the N users, and the attacker must do so
identically to the first round for each of the M − 1 subsequent or they will be
detected.
Note that K must be the same for each round, otherwise at least one user
will recognize the deception.
This results in a non-detection probability of
pc ≤
[(
N
K
)−1]M−1
. (28)
Application of Lemma 2 yields the original expression for arbitrary security pa-
rameters 0 ≤ .
This probability is maximized by setting K as far from N/2 as possible.
That is to say, a well-behaved (or consistently misbehaving) service will respond
consistently with probability 1, and the maximum probability of breaking the
consensus between the users is N1−M , achieved by providing identical responses
to all but a single user each round.
In addition to consistency checking, an attacker must contend with users who
have the ability to check the validity of their responses directly. Should one of
these auditors receive the false value x′ directly, they can immediately raise the
alarm.
Corollary 1. If an auditor having knowledge of the true value x takes part in
the protocol, then the probability of successfully deceiving K out of N users—N
including the auditor—without detection by anyone is
ps[K] =
N −K
N
(
N
K
)1−M
(1 + )M . (29)
Proof. We first consider the case where  = 0. We add an additional success
criterion to Theorem 4. As well as responding consistently to each user, the
service must respond to the auditor with the value x in the first round. This occurs
with probability (N −K)/N , and we multiply by the result stated in Theorem 4
to obtain the result above. Application of Lemma 2 yields the original expression
for arbitrary security parameters 0 ≤ .
Theorem 5. The maximum probability of deceiving without detection any mem-
ber of a group of N users, amongst them an auditor, who follow the protocol above
for M rounds is
pdecep ≤ N − 1
NM
(1 + )M . (30)
Proof. We first consider the case where  = 0. The value of pdecep above is that
given by Corollary 1 with K = 1. We are only interested in the case where K > 0,
since otherwise none of the group have been deceived, and with K < N , since
then the auditor will detect the false message with probability one. We write the
bound from Corollary 1
ps[K] =
N −K
N
(
N
K
)1−M
(31)
=
(N −K)(K!(N −K)!)M−1
N !M−1N
, (32)
and hypothesizing that the maximum occurs when K = 1, we calculate
ps[K]
ps[1]
=
(N −K) (K!(N −K)!)M−1
(N − 1)(N − 1)!M−1 (33)
=
N −K
N − 1
(
N(
N
K
))M−1 . (34)
Since 0 < K < N , both of these terms are at most one, and thus ps[K] attains
its maximum at K = 1, yielding the formula above, for  = 0. Application of
Lemma 2 yields the original expression for arbitrary security parameters 0 ≤ .
This demonstrates the difficulty of surreptitiously breaking the consensus
between users shielded by an anonymizer. As before the probability of consensus-
breaking falls rapidly with protocol iterations, but this time the probability of
deception approaches zero—admittedly only polynomially—as the number of
users increases.
4 Anonymization methods
The question of how to perform the anonymization is not as straightforward
as it might first appear. The simplest way is to use a mix-net, as this naturally
provides the lock-step behaviour that we have assumed in our analysis. However,
this infrastructure is not widely available, and so we briefly turn our attention
to more widely-deployed systems that might prove equally useful.
We use Tor in our prototype on account of its wide availability; in addition to
its large deployed capacity and mature software, its diversity of relay operators
renders systemic failure less likely than with a smaller-scale system intended
specifically for our protocol.
Rather than transmitting batches of messages in lock-step, as a mix-net does,
Tor immediately forwards its received messages—termed onions for their layers
of encryption—to the following relay or, if they are the last in the routing chain,
to their destination. This reduces the latency of the system, making it usable for
interactive tasks. The difference between the structures of these two systems is
shown in Figure 4.
Despite this, while Tor may render difficult the task of determining which
sites a user visits, or conversely which users are visiting a site, our requirement
of anonymity at the level of individual requests is more difficult. The first and
most obvious point is that Tor channels are reused for ten minutes at a time,
and therefore client software must demand a new channel for every request in
order to prevent them from being linked by IP address. Even so, users must be
exceedingly careful if they are to avoid giving information away via fingerprinting
of their client software.
Another risk is that information will be leaked via timing attacks; if the
requests are made at a fixed time, then the order in which the server receives
the requests may allow it to link the requests by the clock error of each user.
The time of each request must therefore be randomized, as must the times at
which channels are set up. An important topic for future work is therefore to
develop an asynchronous alternative to the protocol that we have described.
Client software poses a risk as well—if the service being audited uses HTTPS,
it might attempt to fingerprint a user by its available cipher suites, or by the
time needed for negotiation to take place.
Tor’s use of a long-term guard relay substantially degrades short-term link-
ability, despite its utility in maintaining anonymity over the long term. Guard
relays are stable relays that are selected by the client and then used as the first
hop over a period of weeks to months before being changed [23]. If the clients
do not use a long-term guard relay, then they become vulnerable to predecessor
attacks [24], in which a malicious relay simply waits until it is selected as the
first hop by the client, which it can recognize with traffic analysis.
Our concern is that an attacker will be chosen as a guard with non-negligible
probability, effectively guaranteeing that that client will be deceived, and reduc-
ing N by one in the previous analysis. To avoid this, the first hop must change
with every request, requiring reconfiguration of Tor.
A possibly more secure approach would be to use some kind of protocol that
responds to a single fixed datagram packet, however as Tor does not support
UDP, this approach would require the use of some other anonymizing network.
Nonetheless, with careful design it will be possible to reduce the information
leakage to a level that sufficiently masks the source of each request.
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a) Accessing a keyserver via Tor.
b) Accessing a keyserver via a mix-net.
Fig. 4. Connecting to a public keyserver via Tor and via a mix-net. The user randomly
selects several relays, then adds a layer of encryption for each relay. After receiving a
message, the relays strip their layer of encryption, revealing the address of the next re-
lay. Eventually, the message reaches an exit node, which passes it to the open internet.
Anyone can contribute nodes to the network—including adversaries—however as the
routing path is selected by the user, an attacker cannot gain access to the encrypted
messages with probability better than chance. Mix-nets are composed of a chain of
mixes, which take batches of messages, remove a layer of encryption, shuffle the mes-
sages, then pass them to a new mix. If at least one mix in the chain is honest, then an
attacker cannot connect messages to their senders with probability better than chance.
Another approach is to use auditing servers, as suggested in the CONIKS
architecture [15]. This is similar to Tor in many respects, with clients selecting
the server from which their traffic will appear to come. The use of dedicated
auditing servers has some advantages in that they can sign responses from the
server, allowing a degree of undeniability on the part of the service being audited,
at least to the extent that the auditing servers are trusted. In addition, the
auditing server can cache responses from the service, reducing its load and forcing
it to commit to its equivocated response for all subsequent requests made to
that auditor. This comes at the cost of new server infrastructure with multiple
independent operators, or equivalent changes to existing anonymizing systems;
this prevents the technique from being immediately useful, however the security
gain achievable by such ‘intelligent’ systems is a worthy avenue for future work.
4.1 Assignment of trust
Given that this protocol requires a trustworthy anonymity system, one might
reasonably ask what has been gained from a trust point of view. We avoid the
need for a Byzantine consensus protocol, but depend upon systems like Tor whose
basic security properties are themselves dependent upon a consensus protocol.
While such infrastructure might be used directly to audit the service in ques-
tion, as discussed in previous works, this creates a bootstrapping problem. The
value of a consensus protocol derives from the fact that users believe that most of
participants are honest. The operators of the Tor directory operators are trusted
by the community, the directories that they produce are small enough to be well-
scrutinized, and the consequences of misbehaviour are large. The result is that
Tor is—to most users—more trustworthy than any new auditing mechanism will
be.
The protocol that we describe in this paper does not allow us to completely
sidestep the need to trust an infrastructure provider, but rather allows trust
to be restricted to third parties that have no particular interest in the system
in question. This solves the current problem of unavailability of trustworthy
participants to emerging systems.
4.2 Failure of the anonymity system
Onion routing sacrifices some of the security of mix-networks for low latency [16].
Despite the vulnerability to traffic analysis that results, low latency allows the
system to be used for web browsing and other real-time applications, and has
driven Tor’s wide adoption. Our anonymity system model results in a loose
security reduction, the value  increasing rapidly with the number of users.
We consider two quite similar cases: a mix-net with a single honest mix
whose outputs are surveilled, and the Tor network. In both of these cases, each
request is deanonymized with a fixed probability and independently of the other
requests.
We calculate  as follows: let D be the number of users that have been
deanonymized; this is binomially distributed, with distribution Bin(N, pd). The
attacker has no knowledge of which requests belong to the other users, and must
therefore guess them; this is successful with probability (N −D)!−1. Combining
these, we compute the probability of correctly identifying the source of every
request:
Pr[EXP-SALTor,U,1(A) = 1] (35)
=
1
N !
(1 + ) (36)
=
N∑
d=0
Pr[D = d]
1
(N − k)! (37)
=
N∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
pkd(1− pd)N−k
1
(N − k)! (38)
and thus
 = −1 +
N∑
k=0
pkd(1− pd)N−k
N !2
(N − k)!2k! . (39)
In the case of a mix-net, deanonymization occurs when a layer of encryption
is broken for a message; this allows the content at the input and output of the
honest mix to be linked. Arbitrarily setting pd = 2
−80 and N = 10, we obtain
 ≈ 2−79; this is essentially negligible. Even with 104 users,  increases to a
still-negligible 2−53.
With Tor, we examine the least favourable case, that where the service
in question is malicious. This means that the attacker has knowledge of the
anonymized request times and control over the responses. Traffic analysis allows
them to deanonymize a request whenever one of their relays is selected by the
client for the first hop, thus revealing the client IP address. Suppose that there
are Ni entry relays, of which Ci are compromised or surveilled by the attacker.
Then, if relays are chosen uniformly, the attacker can deanonymize a channel
with probability pd = Ci/Ni. In reality, modern versions of Tor do not select
relays with uniform probability, but weighted by bandwidth [23]; this can be
accounted for by defining Ci and Ni to be bandwidths rather than node counts,
however [25] does not provide this information for the cabals that they detected.
If we consider a reasonably large cabal of 100 malicious relays out of 7000,
for 2 users, Eqn. 39 yields the small but non-negligible  = 0.003. This quickly
increases to  = 2.13 for only 10 users, a substantial loosening of the security
bound.
While we are constrained by space from re-deriving all the results above with
respect to the properties of Tor, we will derive an equivalent to Theorem 2 for
a low-latency onion router, specifically Tor. This demonstrates that control of a
moderately-sized cabal of Tor relays does not greatly reduce the security of our
initial prototype relative to what we have proven above.
Theorem 6. Suppose N users, including Alice and Bob, access a service via an
onion router, each of them being deanonymized independently with probability pd
during each round. Each user executes the protocol described in Section 2 for M
rounds. Then, the probability that Alice will consistently receive the response x
and Bob x′ is bounded as
pdecep ≤
[
1− 1
2
(1− pd)2
]M
. (40)
Proof. For each round, three cases are possible: neither Alice nor Bob are deanonymized,
occurring with probability (1−pd)2, or one is deanonymized, this time with prob-
ability 2pd(1− pd), or both are deanonymized, this occurring with probability p2d.
In the last case, the attacker’s success is trivial for that round. The same is true
if only one of the pair are deanonymized—we suppose without loss of generality
that it is Alice—because the server can respond to Alice with x, and to everyone
else with x′.
If neither Alice nor Bob have been deanonymized, Theorem 3 applies, with
the number of users Na ≥ 2 being that remaining in the anonymity set. The
probability of deception is therefore
pr =
K(Na −K)
Na(Na − 1) (41)
≤
Na
2
(
Na − Na2
)
Na(Na − 1) (42)
=
N2a
4Na(Na − 1) (43)
≤ 1
2
. (44)
This occurs with probability 1− (1− pd)2, and thus the maximum probability
that the attacker succeeds during a given round is
1− (1− pd)2 + (1− pd)2pr (45)
= 1− (1− pd)2(1− pr)
≤ 1− 1
2
(1− pd)2. (46)
Success in each round is independent, so this occurs M times with probability
pdecep ≤
[
1− 1
2
(1− pd)2
]M
. (47)
Using Theorem 6, this yields a deception probability
pdecep ≤
(
1− 1
2
(
1− Ci
Ni
)2)M
. (48)
From [25, Table 2], we see that most malicious relay groups which escape
detection for any length of time have less than 100 members. The Tor network,
by comparison, has approximately 7000 relays [26] at the time of writing. The
effect is to loosen the bound on attacker success from pdecep ≤ 0.5M to pdecep ≤
0.514M . This shows that Tor achieves the original N = 2 security bound with an
arbitrarily large number of users, and so remains useful despite its poor -values
in our more general analysis.
5 Discussion
We have presented a protocol that uses an anonymizing service to create an
auditable broadcast service. This capability is extremely valuable, and can be
used in several ways. We have demonstrated how anonymizing networks can be
used by individuals in order to distribute their own public keys, but with more
and more systems being designed to allow the verification of database entries
via a Merkle tree [27,28,15], we must analyze this type of system as well. In this
case, many users can be assumed to access the same service simultaneously, and
therefore the results from Section 3.4 apply. If more than a handful of users take
part then detection is near-certain, even with very few rounds.
The requirement that the holder of an identity takes part is an onerous
one, but one that could be met should such a technique become ubiquitous, for
example if it is performed automatically by default installations of PGP imple-
mentations by all major vendors. Even if this were not the case, the approach
still serves to reassure the holder of an identity that other users can communicate
securely with them if they choose to take this approach.
The need for multiple rounds makes this approach relatively expensive in
terms of communication. This, in addition to the time needed for failure report-
ing, rules it out in most interactive applications. With systems like CONIKS
this is not a problem, as data that is a few minutes out of date will not cause
any great harm, since the data being broadcast allows any user to be looked
up. When verifying individual keys using the existing PGP keyserver network,
the process must be performed separately for each key. This results in an delay
before first communication can take place, but subsequent verification can be
performed in the background to ensure that the previously-verified key is up to
date.
5.1 Implementation analysis
Our discussion thus far has been quite general, and we briefly discuss what can
be achieved in practice.
The relevant parameters for the system when used to audit keyservers and
Merkle Trees is shown in Table 1.
The first scenario that we consider is the verification of entries on a PGP
keyserver. In this case users access keys directly, verifying them on an individual
Single
Records
Merkle Tree
Root
Number of users assumed 2 N  2
Items validated per user L L
Number of requests per user ML M + L
Probability of undetected failure 2−M (N − 1)N−M
Legacy system support Yes No
Table 1. Costs and security of the proposed protocol for literal-data and Merkle Tree
systems.
basis. It is necessary to make a trade-off here between the time needed to achieve
a reasonable level of verification, and the load placed upon the keyserver.
The requests in this case take the form of search queries for the email address
in question. Both the users and the identity holder must agree on the form of
these search queries and how the the key is to be selected from the results. In
our implementation, the search query is an email address, and the result is taken
to be the first valid key listed in the response.
We suppose here that a round will take place every T = 5 minutes; thus after
time t, M = bt/T c rounds will have taken place. Therefore, in order to achieve
a maximum failure probability pdecep, we require a verification time
t = −T log2 pdecep.
If we arbitrarily determine a success probability of 2−20 to be reasonable—it
seems implausible that we could do substantially better by any other means,
including in-person verification of identity documents—then verification requires
100 minutes, with server load being inversely proportional to the verification
time. This is somewhat inconvenient, but far less so than obtaining a personal
certification, which in all likelyhood will require several hours of time in order
to coordinate, travel, and perform the verification.
Next we consider the Certificate Transparency system. This requires that a
user periodically obtain a Merkle-tree root, with newer roots attesting to previ-
ous values as well. We model our system on Chrome’s software-update system,
supposing that the root will be downloaded at the same time. Chrome checks
for software updates every five hours [29]; if it were to randomize the time of
checking during each five-hour interval, then this matches the situation that we
have analyzed, with the obvious exception being that Chrome does not currently
perform any anonymization.
We make a conservative estimate of Chrome having 100 million active users,
though in reality it is most likely several times higher. This time we have T =
5 hours, and from Table 1 we will require
t = −T log
pdecep
N−1
logN
.
In this case, it is straightforward to obtain a probability of deception of at most
2−20—after the second request, the probability that anyone will be deceived
without the misbehaviour being detected by at least one browser instance or
site owner is 2−26, or approximately 1 in 100 million. These waiting times are
shown in Figure 5.
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Fig. 5. Waiting-time necessary to achieve various levels of security. We show the
hypothesized Certificate Transparency system modelled on the Chrome auto-update
mechanism (top), our proposed keyserver-auditing system (middle), and our concep-
tion of how a keyserver built on something like CONIKS might look (bottom). We see
that very small probabilities of equivocation are achieved within only a few hours, such
that deanonymization and endpoint compromise quickly become far more likely than
chance success by a malicious service.
We reinforce here that this probability is the maximum probability that the
service may succeed in deceiving any user. Thus the average number of users
deceived is approximately pdecep—it is possible, albeit unlikely, that more than
one user will be deceived—and not Npdecep.
We see, then, that our results are useful in practice and can provide mean-
ingful security against malicious services.
5.2 Effects on the Tor network
Our somewhat unusual use of Tor raises the important question of whether the
use of Tor in our system poses a risk to other users of the network, or conversely
whether it might improve the anonymity provided by Tor. Our need to disable
entry guards disabled renders clients using our protocol is rather distinctive, but
it is not clear whether this is problematic.
A greater risk from a usability perspective is that misconfigured applications
might use our unusually-configured version of Tor for traditional applications,
leaving users vulnerable to predecessor attacks. This might be avoided through
application-filtering by a local firewall, but safest of all is to use a modified Tor
client that enforces some kind of client authentication.
A potential positive effect of this protocol is the enlargement of the anonymity
set of Tor users, though this must be balanced against the ease with which an
eavesdropper can differentiate between Tor users using our protocol and those
using Tor in a more traditional manner. Because the protocol is not highly
latency-sensitive, a hypothetical onion router that allows clients to request some
delay before the packet is retransmitted might reduce the risk of traffic confir-
mation attacks to the point that the use of an entry guard can be used, thereby
making the use of our protocol far less obvious.
6 Conclusion
We have shown how an anonymizing service such as Tor can be used to perform
multi-path probing, and so create a public broadcast channel that permits clients
to bound the probability that the broadcasting service can break consensus with
the other clients without detection. Failed attempts to provide different messages
to different parties can be proven by the detecting party with the aid of digital
signatures. Such a protocol has the potential to provide remote verification of
public keys, rendering end-to-end public-key cryptography possible without the
need for trust in certificate authorities or for potentially insecure approaches
such as trust-on-first-use. We have bounded the probability that an equivocating
service will succeed in deceiving its users, and have provided a security reduction
to the anonymization-resistance of the underlying anonymization service.
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A Implementation
We have developed an implementation of this system, which we have dubbed
Keywatch1. It takes the form of a curses program that continuously searches for
a number of email addresses on an HKP keyserver [30] via Tor. We chose to use
Tor rather than a mix-network because of its wide public availability.
Requests are made via libcurl, using Tor’s authentication isolation feature [31,
IsolateSocksAuth] feature to force the creation of new channels. Connections
are made using plain HTTP, reducing the potential for fingerprinting by the
client’s TLS configuration and round-trip times. The client is relied on to have
a sufficiently accurate clock, which is used to determine the time window for
each round of the protocol. The windows are 10 s in duration, and defined to
start at integer numbers of periods since 2000-01-01 0000 GMT. This duration
is short and only suitable for testing; before leaving the prototype stage, it will
be lengthened to several minutes.
Since the clocks of the clients are not necessarily well-synchronized, the re-
quest times allow fingerprinting of the clients. In order to avoid this, the time
of each request within each window is chosen at random according to XnT/2
64,
where T is the window duration and Xn is a random number between 0 and
264− 1 found by filling a 64-bit unsigned integer with bytes from the operating-
system cryptographic random-number generator.
After the index is downloaded, the fingerprint associated with the email
address is taken to be that of the first valid—that is to say, unrevoked and
unexpired—key to which the email address is associated. Once such a finger-
print has been received, it is retained in memory and compared with the first
valid fingerprint from each subsequent request. Should they differ, the key pro-
vided by the offending request will be printed to the terminal.
1 https://github.com/LachlanGunn/Keywatch
